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Civil Procedure. Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291 (R.I. 2001).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in staying discovery pending ruling on a stat-
ute of limitations issue. The supreme court also held that plain-
tiffs claims accrued when the sexual relationship ended and that
her claims were not tolled until she appreciated the full nature and
extent of her injuries. Furthermore, the court held that the per-
sonal injury statute of limitations governed the plaintiffs contract,
fiduciary duty and fraud claims and that the defendants were not
estopped from invoking the statute of limitations.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
During a six-month period, beginning in September of 1994
and ending in February of 1995, Joan Martin (Martin or plaintiff)
engaged in a sexual relationship with her pastor, the Reverend
Evan D. Howard (Howard or defendant).' Ultimately, in 1999,
Martin filed a complaint against Howard in superior court accus-
ing him of what amounted to clergy malpractice by engaging in an
extramarital affair with her.2 Martin alleged that Howard en-
gaged in this relationship without her valid or knowledgeable con-
sent to do so.3 Martin also alleged that in February of 1995, a
church official from the American Baptist Churches of Rhode Is-
land (ABCORI), also a defendant in this case, contacted Martin in-
forming her that Howard admitted having a sexual relationship
with the plaintiff, and that the church defendants would resolve
the situation through the process of an internal church mediation.4
Martin further alleged that a church official notified her on or
about May 30, 1995 that Howard was placed on a six-month paid
leave of absence and that the church had asked him to take the
necessary steps to address his admitted misconduct.5 Martin fur-
ther contended that Howard, before taking his leave, denounced
her to the other parishioners, blaming her for causing him to stray
from his marital vows.6 As a result of the church allowing Howard
to resume his duties in January of 1996 without taking any further
1. Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 294 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 295.
5. Id.
6. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
action to remedy his alleged wrongdoing or to redress Martin's in-
juries, Martin averred that the church allowed Howard to defame
her and to blame her for his own misconduct, leading to her con-
structive removal from the church.7 Moreover, Martin alleged that
because of Howard's conduct, she suffered grievous emotional and
psychological injuries for which she sought an award of money
damages from the defendants.8
In response to Martin's amended complaint, the defendants
moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 The motion was granted on the grounds
that Martin had failed to commence suit on her claims within the
applicable three-year statute of limitations for filing personal-in-
jury actions.' 0
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Stay of Discovery
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the motion justice improperly
prohibited her from conducting discovery pending adjudication of
the defendants' dismissal motion, and that this stay of discovery
hindered her from effectively defending against the pending mo-
tion to dismiss." Martin alleged that she needed to engage in dis-
covery to "flesh out the facts in her complaint".12 However, a trial
court possesses the discretion to stay discovery in a civil case and
prevent litigants from engaging in "fishing expeditions" until one
or more potentially dispositive issues have been decided. 13 The su-
preme court held the motion justice acted well within her discre-
tion when she stayed discovery pending her ruling on the statute-
of-limitations issue. 14
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 296.
10. Id.; see R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b) (2001).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 297.
13. Id. (citing Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S.
689, 694 (1933); Coja v. Stephano, 511 A.2d 980 (R.I. 1986); Smith v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 489 A.2d 336 (R.I. 1985)).
14. Id.
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Failure to Convert the Motion to Dismiss to a Summary
Judgment Motion
The plaintiff also challenged the motion justice's dismissal of
all counts of her amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing
that the justice should have converted the motion to one for sum-
mary judgment under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure. 15 Because the sole function of a motion to dismiss is to
test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court has permitted a
statute-of-limitations defense to be raised by a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) so long as the defect appears on the face of the
complaint.16 However, when the motion justice receives eviden-
tiary matters outside the complaint and does not expressly exclude
them in passing on the motion, then Rule 12(b)(6) specifically re-
quires the motion to be considered as one for summary judgment. 17
In this case, the supreme court concluded that the factual matters
argued on the motion extraneous to the complaint were not
presented in proper form for the court to consider and, as a result,
the motion justice did not err by not converting the motion to one
for summary judgment.' 8
Martin alleged that the motion justice erred by making find-
ings of fact beyond the allegations in her complaint: specifically,
that the motion justice found that the conduct Martin alleged to
have caused her injuries occurred on or before February 1995.19
Martin argued that the date of her injury was a question of fact
that could not be determined by the face of the complaint alone. 20
However, the supreme court held that, on the face of the complaint,
the motion justice's reading of the complaint was the only reasona-
ble conclusion that could be drawn from the sexual-misconduct al-
legations. 21 The complaint revealed that Martin's alleged injury
occurred during a six-month period beginning in 1994 and ending
in February of 1995, while she and Howard engaged in a sexual
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Boghossian v. Ferland Corp., 600 A.2d 288, 290 (R.I. 1991);
Rhode Island Affiliate, ACLU, Inc. v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989);
McDonald v. Rhode Island General Council, 505 A.2d 1176, 1178 (R.I. 1986)).
17. Id. at 298 (citing R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 56).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
relationship.22 Moreover, during 1995, Martin knew that the
church mediation process had not led to the termination of How-
ard's employment with the church or any other significant discipli-
nary measure.23 Therefore, it was apparent within the four
comers of the complaint that Howard's conduct which allegedly led
to Martin's injuries occurred more than three years before Martin
filed her complaint in January of 1999.24 Because Martin was
bound to file her personal-injury claims arising from her relation-
ship with Howard within three years after their relationship ended
and she failed to do so, her claims were all time-barred. 25
The Accrual of Martin's Claims
Martin sought to toll the statute of limitations for her per-
sonal-injury claims beyond the time when both the alleged injury
itself and the wrongful conduct causing that injury should have
been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. 26 The
court noted that in some situations, when the fact of an injury is
unknown to the plaintiff when it occurs, the statute of limitations
is tolled until, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the plaintiff
should have discovered the injury or the wrongful conduct that
caused the injury.27 The court also noted that the "reasonable dili-
gence standard is based upon the perception of a reasonable person
placed in circumstances similar to the plaintiffs, and also upon an
objective assessment of whether such a person should have discov-
ered that the defendants' wrongful conduct had caused him or her
to be injured."28
In this case, Martin argued that because of Howard's sexual
abuse, she did not appreciate the full nature and extent of her inju-
ries at the time she first knew she had suffered harm.29 However,
this court held that even if Martin was initially uncertain about
the impropriety of Howard's conduct at the end of their relation-
ship in February of 1995, church officials from ABCORI made it
very clear to Martin at the end of May of that same year that they
22. Id. at 299.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 300.
27. Id. at 299.
28. Id. at 300.
29. Id.
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considered Howard's conduct to be improper.30 Therefore, Martin
should have known by the end of May about the existence and na-
ture of her alleged injuries and the defendant's role in causing
them.31
Contract Breach, Violation of Fiduciary Duties, Bad Faith, and
Fraud Claims
Also on this appeal, Martin argued that the defendants
breached their agreement to mediate her claims against Howard
and violated the fiduciary duties that they owed to her as a parish-
ioner.32 Martin alleged that the statute of limitations for such
claims is ten years.33 In addition, she argued that the defendants
should be equitably estopped from invoking the personal-injury
statute of limitations to dismiss her cause of action because the
church defendants had, in bad faith, misrepresented the church's
mediation process to her.34
In determining Martin's breach of agreement claim, the court
first had to find whether, based on the face of the complaint, an
enforceable contract to mediate ever existed.35 Although Martin's
counsel suggested that a document may exist that shows the exis-
tence of the agreed-upon terms of the mediation, the supreme court
found that no averment in the complaint described or alluded to
any such signed document.3 6 The court, citing Solomon v. Progres-
sive Casualty Insurance Co.37, held that even if the agreement to
mediate was in writing, the breach of the alleged agreement fails
to state a claim for which relief can be granted.38
The court next had to decide whether or not the injuries Mar-
tin complained of derived from the prior existence of the personal-
injury claims, or whether the asserted breach of contract, bad
faith, fraud, and violation-of-fiduciary-duty claims gave rise to
30. Id. at 301.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 301-02.
37. 685 A.2d 1073, 1074 n.2 (R.I. 1996) (holding that the only recourse would
be to petition the superior court for an order to enforce the terms of the
agreement).
38. Martin, 784 A.2d at 302.
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these injuries.3 9 The court held that the contract Martin at-
tempted to create out of the defendant's alleged promise derived
from and depended upon the prior existence of the personal-injury
claims themselves. 40 The court also noted that the breach of con-
tract claim produced no new or different injuries other than the
personal injuries for which Martin already was seeking damages.41
Therefore, the court held that because the only injuries alleged
were those to Martin's person, the three year statute of limitations
for personal-injury suits applies.42
Martin further alleged that the defendants gulled her into fail-
ing to act.4 3 However, the court stated that the complaint did not
allege that Martin had been contemplating suit but that the
church defendants promised her that mediation would render moot
any need for her to resort to litigation.44
Finally, the supreme court noted that even if Martin had filed
her complaint before the three-year statute of limitations had
elapsed, it would be unlikely that the superior court would have
been able to review and adjudicate the defendants' alleged failure
to conduct a fair and impartial internal church mediation as alleg-
edly promised. 45 The supreme court held that such judicial inquiry
into a matter of "ecclesiastical cognizance" would offend both the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution as well as article I, section 3 of the Rhode Island
Constitution.46
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's
dismissal of Martin's complaint, holding that Martin had failed to
initiate her suit within the applicable three-year statute of limita-
tions for filing personal-injury claims. In addition, the court held
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 303.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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that the motion justice did not err in staying discovery until chal-
lenges regarding the statute of limitations had been resolved.
Michelle M. Alves
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Civil Procedure/Undue Influence. Tinney v. Tinney, 770 A.2d
420 (R.I. 2001). Undue influence is a fact-specific inquiry, deter-
mined by examining the totality of the circumstances.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
At the heart of this appeal from a decision of the superior court
is a famous Newport landmark, Belcourt Castle, located on Belle-
vue Avenue in Newport, Rhode Island.' Built by the renowned ar-
chitect Richard Morris Hunt, Belcourt Castle was falling into
disrepair until it was purchased by Harold and Ruth Tinney in
1956.2 The Tinneys visualized Belcourt Castle as a museum open
to the public.3 Aided by their son Donald and his new wife Harle,
the Tinney's vision slowly became reality.4 In 1974 the Tinneys
hired a handyman, Kevin Koellisch (Kevin) to repair the plumbing
at Belcourt. 5 By 1984, this handy man had become Belcourt's gen-
eral manager. 6
In 1989, Ruth Tinney's husband Harold passed away.7 Ruth
was crushed by her loss, having been married for nearly sixty
years of marriage. His death left Ruth Tinney depressed, devas-
tated and inconsolable.8 Coincidentally, during this trying time for
the matriarch of the Tinney family, witnesses recounted Kevin's
efforts to curry favor with Ruth9 and described his attitude toward
her as "overly solicitous" and "oleaginous."' 0 Kevin took Ruth on
overnight trips, took her dancing and was seen "rubbing"" and
kissing her in public. 12 Witnesses who knew Ruth described this
behavior as extremely out of character for her. 13 As these atten-
tions progressed, Kevin made clear his desire to be adopted as
Ruth's son, and threatened to leave Belcourt if this demand was
1. Tinney v. Tinney, 770 A.2d 420, 423 (R.I. 2001)
2. Id.
3. Id. at 424.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 429.
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not met.14 Apparently, these efforts paid off. In 1990, the eighty-
four year old Ruth adopted the thirty-seven year old Kevin as her
son.15 The adoption prompted Kevin's natural mother to comment
that people would think Kevin had "sold his name for a buck."16
Approximately six months after his adoption, Kevin was
deeded a one-fourth interest in a parcel of Belcourt and became a
joint tenant together with Ruth, Donald and Harle. 17 In 1995,
with Ruth's health deteriorating, the Tinneys and Kevin put
Belcourt up for sale.'8 Before the property sold however, Ruth
passed away, and one-third interests in the property vested in Ke-
vin, Donald and Harle. 19
Kevin's relationship with the remaining Tinney family mem-
bers worsened. By 1997, the relationship had so deteriorated that
Donald and Harle felt the need to keep the Belcourt property from
falling into Kevin's hands.20 By a series of quitclaim transactions,
Donald and Harle became tenants by the entirety.2 1 As a result of
these conveyances, Kevin began threatening Donald and Harle
Tinney with lawsuits and accusations of mismanagement with re-
gard to the operation of Belcourt Castle.2 2 Kevin's actions caused
Donald and Harle so much grief that in April of 1997 they executed
another quitclaim deed which reinstated Kevin as a joint tenant. 23
The appeasement did not last long. In November of the same
year, Donald and Harle once again re-conveyed Belcourt to them-
selves as tenants by the entirety and Kevin followed through on his
threats by bringing suit against the Tinneys for embezzlement of
Belcourt funds. 24 In their answer to the complaint, the Tinneys
asserted that Kevin had procured his interest in the property by
undue influence.25
The trial court found that the Tinneys had met the burden of
proving Kevin had acquired his interest in Belcourt Castle by un-
14. Id.
15. Id. at 425.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 426.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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due influence.26 The trial court was particularly persuaded by the
testimony of Harle and another of the Tinney's witnesses, but
found Kevin's testimony to be unpersuasive and not credible.27
Factors in the trial court's decision included Ruth's extreme de-
pression and loneliness following the death of her husband Harold;
that Ruth became entwined in "a very intimate relationship"26
with Kevin; that Kevin used this relationship to his advantage go-
ing so far as threatening to leave Ruth after he had "gained her
confidence and dependency."29 Kevin was labeled a "bounder and
a con-artist"3 0 who also took advantage of Donald and Harle and
the control that Ruth exerted over them.31 These factors led the
trial court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that undue
influence had been exerted on the Tinney family and consequently,
Kevin's interest in the Belcourt parcel was set aside.32
Following the decision of the superior court, Kevin filed a
timely appeal, asserting among other things, that the trial court
had incorrectly applied the law and had overlooked important evi-
dence showing that Kevin had not asserted undue influence over
the Tinneys.33
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court noted that undue influence is not suscepti-
ble to any one definition. 34 Any effort to restrict undue influence to
a specific set of circumstances might provide a framework for evad-
ing liability. 35 The supreme court held that undue influence is "the
substitution of the will of the [dominant] party for the free will and
choice [of the subservient partyl."36 It is necessarily a fact-specific
inquiry determined on a case-by-case basis.37 The totality of the
circumstances must be explored, with reference to factors such as
26. Id. at 430.
27. Id. at 431.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 432,
34. Id. at 438.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 437-38 (quoting Caranci v. Howard, 708 A.2d 1321, 1324 (R.I.
1998)).
37. Id. at 438.
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the opportunity of the dominant party, the mental state of the sub-
servient party and the relationship between those parties.3s
On appeal, Kevin argued that Ruth had consulted the family
attorney prior to deeding him a parcel of Belcourt; a circumstance
which he believed discounted any showing of undue influence. 39
The court disagreed, holding that the consultation was only one of
many factors the court considered to determine if undue influence
had been asserted. 40
Further, to support his argument that the court had misap-
plied the law, Kevin asserted that the court had only relied on
cases which tended to support a finding of undue influence, while
ignoring a pair of cases which would reach the opposite result.41
The supreme court disagreed, pointing out that the two cases pos-
ited by the plaintiff were not factually similar to the Tinney case.42
Kevin's last argument on appeal was that the court erred in
finding that there was evidence to support undue influence in the
execution of the deed to Kevin. 43 The supreme court first noted
that the findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury are due
substantial deference. 44 The court would not overturn the trial
justice's decision unless the findings of fact were clearly erroneous,
that evidence was overlooked or misunderstood or the ultimate de-
cision failed to do substantial justice between the parties.45
In a forceful rebuke, the court found strong and compelling ev-
idence on the trial court record to find that Kevin's actions toward
Ruth surpassed mere "kindness or consideration" in his quest for
an interest in the Belcourt property. 46 Additionally, the court up-
held the trial justice's finding that Kevin had also asserted undue
influence against Donald and Harle Tinney, using Donald's vulner-
able physical condition and the Tinney's devotion to Ruth to his
advantage in his efforts to procure a deeded parcel of Belcourt.47
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 440.
47. Id.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the specific facts of the case and by a totality of the
circumstances, the supreme court upheld the trial court's finding
that undue influence had been exerted upon the Tinneys to procure
a parcel of Belcourt Castle.48 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
denied plaintiffs appeal and affirmed the decision of the superior
court.
4 9
Jill A. Taft
48. Id.
49. Id.
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